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•
The Kuomintang-Commrinist
Crisis in China
By Anna Louise Strong
T is no service to China either to minimize or exaggerate the present tension
between the Communist Party and the
Kuomintang. The threat of widespread civil
war is serious but the situation is not yet
fatal. It has reached the stage in which the
actions of "friendly nations" may either ruin
or save the situation-in which, for example,
the actions of those in charge of American
foreign loans may prove decisive. But they
must first know-what Chungking censorship
conceals-that there is a situation to be
saved.
The January armed clash in South Anhwei in which some 2,000 of the Communistled New Fourth Army were killed and between 3,000 and 4,000 wounded, after which
the army itself was officially disbanded and
its general, Yeh Ting, held for court-martial,
was only the latest of many armed clashes
between Communist and Kuomintang troops
which have gone on for more than a year.
Nor is even this particular incident settled,
as Chungking officially claimed. On the contrary, it has led to far more threatening developments. The Communists have not accepted the disbanding of the New Fourth,
but have organized their own "Revolutionary Military . Committee" which appointed
new commanders for the 90,000 men which
still function under the name of the New
Fourth north of the Yangtze.

I

An official "spokesman" for this committee
immediately issued an interview in response
to the January 17th announcement of the
Chungking Military Council disbanding the
New Fourth. He charged that the attack on
the New Fourth was only one step in the
plot of the "pro-Japanese elements who occupy high positions in the government and
the Kuomintang" to bring about a peace
pact with Japan and to have China join the
Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Nowhere in his
statement does the spokesman denounce
Chiang Kai-shek himself. He attacks by
name Ho Ying-chin, Chungking's Minister
of War, who has been for some time charged
with being the present center of the proJapanese forces which formerly grouped
around the now puppet-ruler of Nanking,
Wang Ching-wei.
On the basis of these extremely serious
charges, the Communist Military Committee
issued what practically amounts to an ultimatum in twelve points. The demands are of
such a drastic nature that they must be considered as an attempt to break through to
the Generalissimo's attention by dynamite.
They include the "cessation of attacks on
Communist armies,'' the revoking of the order disbanding the New Fourth, the freeing
of its general, Yeh Ting, an open apology
by the government for the "South Anhwei
outrage" and compensation paid to its vic-
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tims, the abolition of a blockade line now
maintained in the northwest again t the
Yenan district, the "punishment" of Ho
Ying-chin and several subordinates, and the
arrest and court-martial of the "pro-Japanese elements" in Chungking. Both the
charges and demands were made immediately following Chungking's January 17th pronouncement, but the news of them was suppressed by Chungking censorship, and
reached America a month late.

CHINA

talk peace. It was then that Japan finally, and
without much enthusiasm, recognized the
Nanking regime of Wang Ching-wei.
No pro-Japanese or pro-peace groups
would dare express themselves openly in
Chungking. Behind the scenes, however, there
are capitulators who express themselves either
by defeatism or by stirring up internal friction, or by actual plotting with the enemy.
As a· high Chungking official, who was not a
Communist, said to me: "Wang Ching-wei
is gone but his secret supporters remain and
International Setting
are at the root of the trouble." The power of
The present situation must be seen against these capi ~ulators would be greatly increased
the background of Japanese plus German if any of the following developments occurintrigue working upon all the backward and red : ( 1 ) if Japan made a big concession,
reactionary elements in China, and exploiting such as withdrawal from the Yangtze valley;
the never completely settled cleavage of the ( 2) if Britain and America ceased to supearlier civil war. The international setting port China's struggle for freedom and deof the present period begins with the Tripar- mocratic progress; ( 3) if hoarding, speculatite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, tion and profiteering continue to demoralize
and with the arrival of many new German internal economic conditions in Free China;
advisers in Tokyo. These events served to or ( 4) if there were an increase in civil strife.
stimulate Japan's desire to settle the "China
In a military sense, the Sino-Japanese war
incident" as rapidly as possible in order to has been for some time at the stage of stalemove south against the French, British and mate, in which Japan's chief weapons have
Dutch possessions, which she is powerless to become economic pressure and political indo with a united and hostile China in her trigue. In using political intrigue Japan
rear.
merely continues to wield a weapon which
Early last autumn, Japan began to spread she used successfully in China for the entire
peace rumors in China. More or less definite generation preceding the present war. Copeace proposals reached Chungking through operation with Japan only recently seemed to
Chinese bankers in Hongkong and even northern provincial governors and even to
through semi-official spokesmen over the many Nanking politicians a respectable path
Tokyo radio. It was intimated that China to riches and power.
need only: ( 1) recognize Manchoukuo,
The first serious check to Japan's policy of
(2) recognize Japan's special interests in "divide and conquer" came when the ten
North China, (3) leave China's ports in years of civil strife between Chiang Kai-shek
Japanese hands, and ( 4) cooperate with the and the Communists was called off in favor of
"New Order in East Asia," which meant al- resistance against the common national foe.
most anything up to a complete economic, This was a program around which all China
political and military alliance with Japan. rallied; even backward, provincial warlords
In return for this, Japan would withdraw her were compelled to submit to the Chinese
troops from Central and South China- people's will for unity against Japan. Genwhich Japan most devoutly longs to do. eral Han Fu-chu, Governor of Shantung, was
Chiang Kai-shek, however, strengthened by executed for the kind of dealing with the
the British and American loans, refused to enemy which was political wisdom a year
4

CRISIS

IN

earlier. But it would be utopian to assume
that all the former traffickers with Japan
were at once converted. There is still a
strong tendency among China's reactionary
militarists to regard Japan as the natural
military organizer of East Asia. Moreover,
Japan's fifth column work has been greatly
strengthened by her pact with Germany, for
Germany, having given considerable help to
the Chungking government in the early
stages of the war, still has many friends in
high places in China.

CHINA

at Yenan was never 1 ally recognized. It
was never clearly deterinined whether the
Communist Party was legal or illegal. It
depended on the will of the local generals,
most of whom suppressed Communists. The
~upposed amnesty of 1937 was only partly
carried out; two Americans traveling in 1940
in South Kiangsi found 60 forgotten Communist prisoners in a single prison, held since
1934. (They are still there.) In Hankow itself there were assassinations of Communists
and raids on their newspaper by gangsters
alleged to have ties with the secret police of
the Kuomintang. When these matters
reached the attention of the Generalissimo,
however, he usually demanded that the aggressors live up to the new unity that had
been proclaimed.
No governmental machinery had been
established through which unity Inight be expressed and questions settled. The "National
Congress" consisted of Kuomintang members elected four years previously during
the period of civil war; and some of its
members were and still are in Japanese puppet governments. A constitution making the
Kuomintang the only legal party had been
drawn up, but due to the Japanese invasion
the Congress had not met to adopt it. Beginning in Hankow, the democratic forces demanded a new National Congress based on
popular elections, but the government Ininisters who had been appointed by the previous Congress and who would be inevitably
unseated by any new Congress, claimed that
elections could not be held during the war.
The deadlock in which the old Congress
could not be summoned and a new one could
not be elected was partly broken by a new
body, "The People's Political Council,"
formed during the Hankow period in
response to popular demand. It has 220
members representing practically all the different political groups in China, but its
powers are advisory only and its membership
is handpicked by the Kuoinintang which
decides even who shall represent the Com-

The Hankow Period

The high point of Chinese national unity
was reached during the "Hankow period,"
from the fall of Nanking in 1937 to the fall
of Hankow in late 1938. Nanking's fall had
broken the exclusive hold of the Shanghai
capitalists over the government. Chiang Kaishek had announced that the vast peasant
populations of the interior were China's new
base. Hankow was an ideal capital, more
easily accessible to all parts of the interior
than either Peiping, Nanking or Chungking.
Hankow had peasant revolutionary traditions
of nearly a century, dating back to the days
of the Taipings. It had a larger industrial
working class than any Chinese city except
Shanghai. From the Inilitary standpoint, the
heroic but bloody defense of Shanghai had
shown China's weakness in traditional methods of war, but the sudden emergence of
the Communist-led guerrillas in North China
was giving new hope to the nation. All of
these factors helped to create a new sense of
national unity around Hankow as a center, a
unity in which the Communists played an
important part.
The unity attained in the Hankow period,
however, was never reduced to organized
form. Despite much talk of democracy and
much energetic popular initiative, the Kuomi.ntang Party never recognized as legal any
popular organizations except those which
they themselves initiated and controlled. The
Cmnmunist Border District with its capital
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munist Party. The members of the People's
Political Council whom I met in Chungking seemed to be able and devoted intellectuals greatly disturbed by the growing disunity in China, but powerless to prevent it.
They complained that they had formed a
committee almost a year ago to investigate
the Kuomintang-Communist friction but the
Chungking government paid no attention. to
their report.
Chiang Kai-shek's power obviously does
not rest upon such ineffective forms of government. It rests upon his armies and his
moral prestige as the symbol of China's
unity. He has no constitutional power to reorganize the government. He is neither the
president of a democracy nor a fascist dictator; his status is more like that of the ear!y
kings who emerged from feudalism through
the allegiance of many rival lords. If he
greatly desired, he might get rid of any individual minister in the government or any
individual general in the army, but only by
political combinations and pressures which
might sap his power in another direction.
He has no conception of what is meant by
"rule of the people"; he once said, "If the
people rule, then how can I rule?" Moreover, to make changes in a democratic direction became harder rather than easier with
the lapse of time. For by the time the government moved to Chungking, it was so
widely accepted as the "Central Government
of China" in a sense which no government
had ever been before, that even those bankers of the coast who were ready to make
terms with Japan felt the authority of
Chungking and returned to it. They resumed
their wonted sway which the fall of Nanking
had temporarily broken. Even the talk of
democracy, which had been so vivid during
the days in Hankow, died. When I visited
Chungking in December, 1940, no public
meetings were allowed without a representative of the police, empowered to interrupt the
speech at any moment.

CHIN A

General Ho Ying-chin

Ministers who had seemed slated for immediate dismi~sal during the Hankow period
not only remained but increased their power.
The most notorious case was that of General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, by
whom all commands to the armies are issued.
For the past decade he has been famous for
two things: his wars with the Communists
and his agreements with Japan. The 1935
Ho-Umetsu agreement, for instance, gave
Japan such dominance of North China that
it became the cause of student demonstrations against "Japan and Ho Ying-chin."
Its ter~could never be published in China
proper lest they cause the fall of the Nanking government. General Ho was known to
be opposed to the present war with Japan.
Today he signs all the orders that carry it
on. All orders to Communist armies and all
complaints from Communist armies to the
Generalissimo pass through his hands.
When I expressed in Chungking my
amazement that a m an with this past should
be kept by the Generalissimo in such an important post, I was told: "Oh, but the Generalissimo could hardly do without him and
it is not even certain that he could depose
him. General Ho has much closer relations
with all the lower generals than has the Generalissimo himself." One need not elaborate
on the chances for intrigue which this
creates. Ho Ying-chin has used the new
Chinese unity, which he did his best to prevent, as the slogan under which he transferred troops and officers, breaking all rivals
and building his own military machine. He
has thus placed himself in a position to be
Japan's most valuable ally in the military
domination of East Asia.
New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies

Far away from Chungking in the north
and east of China, separated from "Free
China" by Japanese concentrations and
Chinese armed forces alike, the Communist-
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led armies rapidly increased. They were assigned only territory which the Japanese had
already conquered, the Eighth Route in
North China and the New Fourth on the
Lower Yangtze. They were allotted pay for
45,000 soldiers in the Eighth Route and a
much smaller number in the New Fourth.
They were, however, allowed to organize
peasant guerrillas and on this basis they
grew rapidly, until by the end of 1940 they
claimed from 500,000 to 600,000 armed but
unpaid men. They campaigned all over Japanese-occupied China, from Manchuria to the
Yangtze, from the Mongolian deserts to the
sea. They penetrated Manchuria to within a
hundred miles of Mukden, and established
contact with 100,000 poorly organized Manchurian Volunteers. They reached the Shantung coast and held the port of Chefoo long
enough to collect customs revenue and run
in several shiploads of war supplies from
Shanghai and Tientsin. They disrupted
Japanese rail communications on all sides of
Peiping and put up proclamations inside the
city walls. Extending southward the Eighth
Route eventually made contact with the
New Fourth Army, which in its turn was expanding along the entire Yangtze Valley
from the area north of Shanghai to districts
almost as far inland as Hankow.
This "unruly expansion" was the chief
thing held against the Communist armies by
Chungking officials with whom I talked in
December 1940. Both Sun Fo and Pai
Chung-hsi told me that if the Communists
would remain in the areas assigned them,
organize only the authorized number of
troops and obey the local magistrates appointed by Chungking, there would be no
trouble. But the Communists were faced with
ever-increasing bands of hungry, armed
peasants who demanded to be taken into
their armies, and who otherwise would degenerate into local bandits or Japanese puppet troops. Their attempts to give these
peasants leadership and organization against
Japan were handicapped by lack of funds and
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food. Since Chungking refused support for
such numbers, they tried to form local governments whose taxing-power could regularize the food levies on the countryside. In this
they were opposed by local magistrates appointed by distant Chungking, who had no
interest in giving them food. "When we got
customs revenue from Chefoo," said a young
woman with the Eighth Route Army, "the
Shantung governor expected us to give it to
him. He lost Chefoo to the Japanese and we
got it; we needed the food for ourselves."
This was the origin of one local clash.... All
such clashes took place far behind Japanese
lines, and news of them reached Chungking
through channels provided by Ho Ying-chin.
Under such conditions local clashes grew
more frequent and widespread, with increasing participation by the authorities in
Chungking. The first serious armed clash occurred late in 1939 in North Shensi. The
Special Border District, with its capital at
Yenan, had declared allegiance to the
Chungking Government, but the Central
Government had given no legal status nor
fixed boundaries to the district. General Hu
Tsung-nan, Governor of Shensi, decided
that the district was his and sent armies
to occupy it ; generals in Kansu collaborated. After Yenan had lost four of the
twenty-three hsien which it claimed, part of
Ho Lung's men-Eighth Route forces operating JUSt across the Yell ow River-came back
to Yenan as home defense. Yenan lost no
more hsien but three concentric lines of
block-houses began to be built in narrowing
circles against the Border District-the tactics
which squeezed the Communists out of South
China in the earlier civil war. By the end of
1940 two thousand such block houses had
been built.
The next important clash occurred in the
adjacent province of Shansi between the Old
and New Armies of Yen Hsi-shan. Yen's
original army broke very badly in 1937 under
the first J apanese onslaught which they had
never been equipped to withstand. Yen re-
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organized them, adding local peasant boys.
Much of this enrollment was taking place
during my visit to Shansi in 1938. Thousands of Shansi boys were applying to join
the Eighth Route because of its superior
prestige, but they were being told: "We
have no money for soldiers; join Yen Hsishan." Yen's new army was therefore strongly pro-Eighth Route and followed its tactics
in organizing the local peasants. Conflicting
accounts exist of the clash that finally developed between the two different armies of
General Yen. Chungking claims that it was
inspired by the Eighth Route; Communists
state that, on the contrary, it broke out in
spite of them, and that, after it occurred,
they "mediated" and induced the New
Army to withdraw to Northwest Shansi. In
any event, the New Army now operates in
close conjunction with the Eighth Route in
that territory, where to some extent it replaces the forces that returned to Yenan.
Throughout 1940 an armed blockade separated all Eighth Route and New Fourth
territory from "Free China." An estimated
one-fifth of Chungking's total forces were
diverted to "watching" the Communists.
Students trying to go to Yenan for education
were detained in Sian; if they persisted in
their dangerous desire they were thrown
into concentration camps. For fourteen
months the Eighth Route claimed to have
received no munitions or medical supplies
from the Central Government; if any were
sent, they failed to get through. Truckloads
of medical supplies sent by Madame Sun
Yat-sen's organization, the China Defense
League, were indefinitely detained. Even a
foreign doctor who tried to reach Wutaishan
to replace Dr. Norman Bethune was unable
to pass and finally accepted medical service
among Central Government troops. One occasion at least is recorded when armed men
taking the payroll for the New Fourth Army
were seized by other Chinese troops of the
Central Government; neither the payroll nor
the soldiers were ever released. Only oc-
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casionally could this unofficial blockade be
penetrated by men with high prestige.
Clashes between Communist-led armies
and other Central Government forces became
epidemic in the summer of 1940. They took
place in Hopei, Shantung, North Kiangsu,
East Anhwei, South Anhwei and at the
northern edge of Chekiang. Details are impossible to verify, since each side charges
the other with attacking, and though the
Communists asked for an investigation commission, none was sent. Meanwhile the high
staffs in the Kuomintang-led armies made
speeches to their subordinates urging that
they must be prepared to fight the Communists. Pamphlets were published denouncing
the Communists as the most dangerous element in the nation; in Hongkong I was told
that 200,000 such pamphlets had been sent
out to Overseas Chinese. Deadly phrases
were whispered: "Japanese are only lice on
the body of China but Communism is a
disease of the heart." The repression spread
beyond the Communists to all united front
organizations; the famous "Life" bookshops
of the National Salvation Movement were
closed in ten cities. Many organizers of the
Industrial Cooperatives were arrested,
kidnaped and even assassinated as "Reds,''
a term which might merely cover the
jealousy of a local official who failed to get
his squeeze from the cooperatives.
Ho Ying-chin Cooperates with the Japanese

There seems reason to think, in at least
three cases, that local generals, acting under
Ho Ying-chin's orders to check the Communists, were simultaneously cooperating with
the Japanese. General Shih Yu-shan, who
clashed with the Eighth Route in South
Hopei, was a man of a picturesquely adventurous past. He began his career as a
commander under Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang
and was left at loose ends when Feng was
defeated by Chiang Kai-shek. When the
present war with Japan began, Shih despaired of getting funds from Chiang Kai8
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shek so he went over openly to Japan. After
receiving money and munitions for his needy
troops, he declared loyalty to Chungking and
gained much face for thus outwitting the
Japanese. He expected to be made Governor
of Hopei and was disgruntled when denied
the post. He was, however, assigned the territory of South Hopei and is alleged to have
had orders from Ho Ying-chin to check the
Eighth Route's expansion by cutting the
connections between their Shansi and Central Hopei forces.
Charges that General Shih was conspiring
with the Japanese were sent to Chiang Kaishek on July 2 in an official telegram by Chu
Teh, commander-in-chief of the Eighth
Route. He stated that on June 22, General
Shih sent instructions to all his subordinates
giving a code of signals, consisting of white
sheets placed on the ground, by which Japanese planes could distinguish his troops from
those of the Eighth Route. This information, plus other details of Shih's collaboration
with the Japanese, had been given to Chu
Teh by Shih's subordinates who did not wish
to side with Japan. No answer was received
from Chungking to this accusation, but later
in July Shih's forces, in coordination with
Japanese puppet troops and with the aid of
Japanese planes, attacked the Eighth Route
near Puyang and Poshan. Shih was shot by
one of his own brigade commanders and most
of his troops came over to the Eighth Route.
For several months no details of this conflict
reached Chungking, and details arc still conflicting. But by the end of November it hecame known that General Shih was dead.
Then General Wei Li-huang, commander of
the war zone in which the incident occurred,
announced that he had executed Shih for
treason,-thus removing the onus of mutiny
from his subordinates. The Central News
Agency in Chungking, however, announced
that Shih had been executed "for expanding
his territory in defiance of orders."
Similar charges of treason were made
against General Miao Chen-liu, commander

of the 57th Army in South Shantung. Chu
Teh sent a telegram to the Generalissimo in
July, giving an exhaustive list of Miao's alleged dealings with the Japanese, as revealed
to Chu Teh by Miao's subordinates. These
included the exchange of signals, exchange
of emissaries, joint banquets-in fact, a fully
worked out system of combined attack
against the Eighth Route. No answer came
from Chiang Kai-shek but Ho Ying-chin
telegraphed back: "Don't slander your fellow-generals." Telegrams from division commanders under General Miao next went to
Chungking revealing more conferences with
the Japanese and appealing over the head
of their commander to the Generalissimo. On
October 9th, the entire staff of the 57th Army
signed a joint telegram to Chiang Kai-shek
declaring their general a traitor and demanding his execution. None of these telegrams was answered, but word was spread in
Chungking that "the Eighth Route is stirring up trouble in other Chinese armies."
Finally Miao's staff arrested him and sent
him under guard to the commander-in-chief
of the war zone who forwarded him to
Chungking, where he is now busily circulating his version of the affair. Meanwhile his
troops, like those of General Shih's, have
augmented the forces of the Eighth Routean indication of what may happen if civil
war begins.
Then there was the case of Admiral Shen
Hung-lieh, Governor of Shantung. On
August 5 Chu Teh wired the Generalissimo
the details of how Shen's troops in coordination with the Japanese had attacked the
115th Division of Lin Piao. On September 14
Chu Teh again wired the Generalissimo
other details. On September 24 the Kuomintang Provincial Committee of Shantung
wired the Kuomintang Executive in Chungking reporting Shen's liaison with the Japanese. All these accusations and protests were
disregarded.
"We interpret these incidents," said a representative of the Eighth Route to me, "as
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meaning that General Ho Ying-chin is ready
to cooperate even with Japanese against the
Communists."
To my query whether Chiang Kai-shek
had the same attitude as Ho Ying-chin, he
replied: "We do not even know whether the
Generalissimo gets all of our telegrams. We
believe that Chiang does not at present want
to make an agreement with Japan. He wishes
to suppress the Communists more and more
but not quite to the point of civil war and
not quite to the point of interfering with
the war against Japan. It is a very narrow
road. Until now he has been able to take it.
But he cannot take it long."
Military History of the New Fourth Army

The Generalissimo, however, has chosen
to have a show-down and as a first step accepted personal responsibility for disbanding
the New Fourth Army in the Yangtze Valley.
This army consisted officially of four "units,"
functioning as independent groups in different areas on both sides of the Lower
Yangtze, assigned to them originally by
Chiang Kai-shek. After the fall of Hankow
the New Fourth was augmented by 20,000
dispersed soldiers from Central Honan who
formed a fifth unit, and by large numbers of
peasants on the borders of Hupeh, Honan
and Anhwei who formed a sixth detachment.
Later a battalion known as the Shangnan
Volunteers, organized south of the Yangtze,
grew so large that the commander of the
war zone objected to it, and it crossed the
Yangtze to avoid trouble and took its station north of Shanghai and north of the
river.
Thus the New Fourth operated on both
sides of the Yangtze almost from Shanghai
to Hankow, in small detachments separated
by some of the heaviest Japanese concentrations in China. For three years its units were
in constant contact with the Japanese, attacking the Nanking-Shanghai railway, the
Wuhu-Nanking railway, and the highways
between Nanking and Hangchow. They
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wrecked trains, waylaid Japanese army
trucks, stopped trade with the Japanese-held
cities. In the autumn of 1938 they raided the
Japanese-occupied airdrome within sight of
Shanghai and hoisted the Chinese flag above
its buildings. In the first year, the detachments south of the river fought more than
600 engagements, most of them small affairs
but all of them wearing down the Japanese.
"We h ave been able to detain 50,000 Japanese in this area," claimed General Yeh Ting.
"No matter how often they change their
troops, they never dare lessen the number
which they maintain here." The people in
Chekiang called the army "the soldiers of
God" and "world army No. 1." They had a
saying, "as in lettuce you eat the heart, so
if you join the army join the Fourth." Other
Central Government armies held positions
flanking this territory, but only the New
Fourth operated all around and in between
the enemy-held towns.
With the general worsening of relations
between Communist and Kuoinintang forces,
a whole series of armed clashes took place
between the New Fourth and surrounding
Chinese armies, beginning in February 1940.
Endless details of these clashes are available,
but in the absence of checking, nobody knows
how accurate the details are. It seems at least
clear that the New Fourth payroll was seized
on one occasion, and its normal river-crossing, by which communication with Chungking and with troops on both banks was
maintained, was permanently blocked. The
New Fourth claims to have intercepted
secret instructions from Chungking to local
commanders to suppress all New Fourth
forces by the end of the year. On the other
hand, the New Fourth was plainly increasing
its influence in the nearby armies, many of
whose troops came over to its ranks during
the armed clashes.
D espite these frictions between Chinese
forces, the New Fourth continued to fight
the J apanese. Major Evans F. Carlson, who
visited the area occupied by the New
10
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Fourth in Southern Anhwei last October, reports in the China Defense League news letter one of their victories near Kianghsien. "I
arrived in this area," he said, "shortly after a
particularly aggressive Japanese drive had
been turned back by the New Fourth Army.
The Japanese came in two columns, one
from near Wuhu .... They were allowed to
make a deep penetration and then the mobile
units of the New Fourth fell upon their flanks
and rear, forcing them to withdraw with a
loss which was estimated, both by the New
Fourth and Central Government officials, at
an aggregate of 7,000 casualties." Major
Carlson was also struck by the emphasis on
the "united front"; even the small children
talked to him earnestly about the "need for
all people to work together for National Salvation." He adds, "There were many signs of
the close cooperation between the army and
the people."
Relations between the New Fourth and
the commander of the War Zone, General
Ku Chu-tung, were not so excellent. He maintained a blockade against the New Fourth
which it was perilous to try to pass. A brilliant
young intellectual, Wu Ta-kwan, took a party
of Chinese journalists to the New Fourth
region. General Ku asked them not to visit
the New Fourth, but they replied that since
they were "comforting" all the armies in this
region, they would comfort the New Fourth
too. On their return they were summoned before General Ku, and their young leader
went alone. He was never seen afterwards.
Telegrams sent by Mme. Sun Yat-sen to
ascertain his fate were met by General Ku's
bland statement that "he had never heard
of the man."
The Order to Move and Disband

The New Fourth was ordered to leave the
Yangtze Valley and move north of the Yellow
River to be amalgamated with the Eighth
Route. This was given as a "proposal" in
July and as an "order" on October 19. The
Generalissimo himself did not sign the order
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till December 10, and there is excellent reason
for believing that it was originally issued by
Ho Ying-chin without Chiang's knowledge,
and later confirmed in the interests of army
discipline. The New Fourth regarded the
order almost as an instruction to commit
suicide. They pointed out that only one-tenth
of their army was on government pay-roll,
and the rest consisted of local peasants who
could not easily leave their homes. No winter
uniforms had been furnished, no supplies for
the long journey, and no munitions had been
received for eight months. Yet they were required to cross several heavy Japanese concentration and pass by many of the Central
Government armies which were already
clashing with them in armed battle and
which gave no pledge of permitting them to
pass. They were promised munitions and
pay after they should reach the Yellow River
but they had fairly good reason for assuming
that they were not expected to arrive.
The Communists' most serious objection
to the order, however, wa~ that they considered it not a routine military command
but a political and rnilitarv splitting of China
into two parts, in preparation for peace with
Japan in Central and South Chi.m . None of
those with whom I talked claimed that this
was the Generalissimo's intention. Chiang
Kai-shek himself in an interview with me indignantly denied any intention of making
peace with J apan or of leaving any part of
China outside his rule. But it was clear that
the concentration of all the Communists in
North China-which had never been under
allegiance to Chiang anyway-would give
Japan a heaven-sent excuse for concentrating
her attacks in that region. If she should
then choose to make a demonstrative withdrawal from the Yangtze Valley, the peace
tendencies in Chungking would be immeasurably strengthened.
"We do not refuse to obey the military
order," said the Communists, "but we want
it made part of a wider political settlement
which will allow democratic safeguards in
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all of Free China. We can trust the Chinese
people to preserve their unity against Japan.
But if all Communists are put in North China
and prohibited ebewhere, and no people's
movements are allowed, we cannot trust the
Chungking bureaucrats. The result will be
either civil war or the splitting of China into
two parts, with neither of which alternatives
can we agree."
Throughout December, during my visit in
Chungking, the capital was buzzing with the
"threat of civil strife." Scores of Chinese
leaders were urging "patience" and "unity."
Reactionaries were gloating: "We have them
surrounded and can crush them." Meanwhile
some twenty-seven divisions of Central Government troops, uncontaminated by previous
contact with the "Reds" were moving eastward to surround the New Fourth Army with
the obvious intent of forcing it out of the
Yangtze Valley or eliminating it from the
scene. Minor clashes with local forces continued through most of December.
The Ambushing of New Fourth Troops

First news of the final clash was announced from Chungking on January 17 by
the Military Council which stated that Yeh
Ting had been imprisoned and was awaiting
court-martial, following suppression of a
"revolt" by his troops. Yeh Ting was accused of having plotted "to control the
China coast from Chekiang and Kiangsu in
the south to Shantung in the north"-all
regions, incidentally, held by Japan. General
Ku Chu-tung, commander of the 3rd War
Area, was credited with having "successfully
suppressed the rebels." A few days later,
Edgar Snow reported from Hongkong that it
had been the New Fourth Army's rear-guard
of some 10,000 men which had been surrounded, and that they had fought for eight
days, losing 4,000 casualties before they were
suppressed.
Only a month later did full uncensored
details arrive from China, signed by Chinese
of standing who had steadily supported the
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united front. It seems that Commander Yeh
Ting finally received in late December part
of the money needed for moving his army
north as ordered. Taking this as evidence of
good faith, he sent his forces over the river,
the last to leave being a rear-guard of 4,000
armed men protecting some 6,000 unarmed
persons, consisting of families of officers, political workers, and the hospital with nurses,
doctors and wounded.
This force of 10,000, more than half unarmed, was surrounded by 80,000 Chungking troops in a narrow mountain pass near
Maolin, and were attacked by troops under
General Shankuan Yun-hsian on January
6th. They ran out of food on the fourth day,
and fought without eating until their ammunition gave out on the eighth day. They
telegraphed to Chungking begging that the
attack on them be stopped, and were told
that General Ku Chu-tung, the war zone
commander, had already been told to stop it.
During the sixth day of their fighting, questions were raised in the National Military
Commission in Chungking, to which Ho
Ying-chin replied that "everything is proceeding satisfactorily," that the New Fourth
is obediently moving northward, and that a
"slight difficulty" had arisen which he had
directed General Ku to solve. On the seventh
day of the fighting, Mme. Sun Yat-sen and
others telegraphed an appeal from Hongkong. The fighting ended on the eighth day
when munitions gave out. Of the 10,000
people, more than 2,000 were killed and 4,000
wounded or captured; the dead included
numerous political workers, technicians,
nurses and children. The remnants of the
New Fourth were arrested, and their general, Yeh Ting, held for court-martial. The
second in command, Hsiang Ying, was
wounded and subsequently killed. (General
Yeh Ting was then taken to the headquarters of General Ku Chu-tung in Shangyao,
Kiangsi Province, which is noted as the location of Ku's torture chamber where many
patriotic youths have met their death. Since
12
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Chungking. The next steps were the destruction of the New Fourth forces south of the
Yangtze and the official disbanding of the
entire New Fourth Army. These steps were
taken in January. According to the Communist spokesman, the future development of
this plot will involve the following: actions
by large Chungking armies "tightly cooperating with the Japanese armies" in the regions
between the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers to
separate the New Fourth from the Eighth
Route in order to liquidate them separately.
Following this, pretexts would be sought for
the official disbanding of the Eighth Route
Army and the arrest of its commander, Chu
Teh. Next would come arrests of Communists all over China, including Chou En-lai,
official representative of the Eighth Route
Army in Chungking, who is already under
surveillance. The Communist daily newspaper would be closed and large-scale war
would be launched to seize Yenan.
Japan, it is alleged, would next withdraw
her troops from the Yangtze Valley, and
throw them into a ruthless war against the
New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies in
North China. Fifth column elements in
Chungking would then celebrate the recovery
of the lost territories as due to the valor
of Chungking troops, and would demand a
"glorious, victorious peace." If it proved impossible to call off the war officially, because
of the Chinese people's objections to the
Japanese terms, an undeclared truce would
reign in all parts of China except the North
where the plotters would obstruct the Communist armies by means ranging from blockade to armed attack. All anti-Japanese
elements would, of course, be persecuted as
alleged Communists-a tactic familiar from
the days when the government was at Nanking. Thus Chinese public opinion would be
taught to believe that victory had been won
everywhere except in those northern regions
where "the Communists either cannot or will
not drive out Japan."
This would make possible the signing of

there are no foreign correspondents in Shangyao, General · Yeh's transfer there suggests
that his fate is to be settled without risk of
unfavorable publicity.)
On January 17, four days after the conclusion of this battle, the Chungking Military Council-it is not known whether the
Generalissimo was included-issued the order
disbanding the New Fourth. Ten days after
this, on January 27, the Generalissimo himself assumed responsibility for the official
disbanding but stated that it would not affect other Chinese troops, i.e. the Eighth
Route. Thereafter, Chungking censorship
shut down and Chinese representatives in
this country spread the word that the Communists had accepted the disbanding and
there would be no more trouble.
Communist Revolutionary Military Committee
Issues Official Order

Belated material from China, however, makes plain the tremendous tensions of
the past month. On January 20, three days
after the official order of January 17, the
"Revolutionary Military Committee" of the
Chinese Communist Party-which has not
been heard of since the earlier civil warissued an "Official Order" reorganizing the
New Fourth under the command of ChenYi, formerly the commander of the New
Fourth's First Unit. A few days later-in any
event before January 26, the date on which
my information was mailed from China-the
"spokesman of the Revolutionary Military
Committee" issued his detailed charges, outlining the fifteen steps of the alleged plot by
"pro-Japanese elements" in Chungking to
take China into the Axis. Such accusations
have been made for the past year, but never
in so definite a form. Especially interesting
is the fact that some of the steps in the alleged plot took place while the letter containing the charges was on the ocean.
The first step was the barrage of propaganda against the Communist armies which
was going on during my December visit in
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the actual peace pact which would leave
Japan or Japanese puppets in control of
North China-insofar as they could clear
out the Communists-and of China's ports.
China would then join the Axis. (If this
transition seems a bit abrupt to American
readers, it must be remembered that the
Germans have always been popular in China,
since they lost their rights of extra-territoriality, and that Germany gave significant help
to the Chinese in the early stages of this
war. Granted the illusion of a "glorious
peace of victory," it might not be impossible
to direct considerable nationalist feeling into
the channel of "clearing the rest of the imperialists out of East Asia and the South
Seas.")
Regardless of whether these charges will
prove correct in every detail, large-scale civil
war looms behind the fact that they were
made. Some 800,000 Chungking troops, onehalf the government forces, are now in positions for attacking the Communists. About
80,000 are said to have been engaged in the
disarming of the New Fourth rear-guard
south of the Yangtze in the battle which
raged January 6th to 13th. Another 200,000
to 300,000 have moved into North Anhwei
and K.iangsu where they separate the Eighth
Route from the New Fourth; and are already
reported to be engaged in attempts to defeat
them. In the northwestern provinces, an
estimated half million encircle the Yenan
district and blockade the Eighth Route Army
in Shansi.
The Future of the New Fourth Army

Meanwhile, the reorganized New Fourth
Army, with 90,000 men north of the Yangtze
under its new acting commander, Chen Yi,
is still the pivot on which the future turns.
It has been ordered by the Communists'
Military Committee to continue the fight
against Japan in the name of Chinese nationalism, on the basis of Sun Yat-sen's Three
People's Principles "while always guarding
against the sudden attack of the pro-Japa-
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nese elements," i.e. attacks which may be
launched by Ho Ying-chin. If attempts are
made to disband these New Fourth forces,
the Communists' Military Committee officially states that the Eighth Route will come to
its assistance. This will give the Communists an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 seasoned fighters, a much smaller and worse-armed
force than Chungking possesses. But Chungking contains elements that will not hold
together in a war against the Communists,
especially if the Communists can convince
the local population and soldiers that they
are being wantonly attacked.
.
If this struggle really begins, it will not be
the mere disarming of a few Communists.
It may well change the map of China and
East Asia, and the balance of the present
world war. Chungking exists today as the
Central Government of China only because
it is the symbol of unity toward which ninetenths of the Chinese people passionately
aspire. This gives it the prestige which controls recalcitrant provincial warlords who
might otherwise carve restless kingdoms of
their own or bargain profitably with Japan.
Governors of at least two of the sea coast
provinces are reputed to favor Wang Chingwei, but are held to Chungking by the pressure of the Chinese people. Yunnan in the far
South shows repeated tendencies to go off
on its own.
If Chungking ceases to be the symbol of
Chinese unity, warlords all over the country
may pull loose.
One pattern which might easily emerge
would be the old split of China into "Three
Kingdoms" which has occurred more than
once before. There would be Nanking, already recognized by Japan and from which
Germany and Italy would no longer have a
reason for refusing recognition; Chungking,
a mountain republic approached through the
back door of Burma, and recognized by
America and Britain unless Ho Ying-chin
combined it with Nanking; and a north or
northwest republic, either "united front" or
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Communist, which would ask for and perhaps eventually secure recognition from the
U.S.S.R. It seems likely, however, both from
the Communist representatives' sta.tements
to me last December and from the details of
such events as now get past the Chungking
censorship, that the Communists will for the
present try to avoid this three-cornered
geographical split and will rather seek to
arouse popular movements and pressures
throughout China in order to effect a new
governmental grouping in Chungking.
Important political figures have already
separated themselves from the actions of
Chungking. Mme. Sun Yat-sen led a group
of Kuomintang members in a joint message
on Jan. 12th to the Generalissimo and the
Central Committee of the Kuomintang, appealing for the resumption of the national
united front. On the same day, Marshal
Feng Yu-hsiang, addressing a committee of
the National Military Commission in Chungking, cited Poland and France as glaring
examples of nations destroyed by internal dissension, and made a plea for national solidarity. The aged General Yen Hsi-shan spoke
even more strongly in an interview telegraphed Jan. 11th to Hongkong: "There are
undesirable elements in the Kuomintang who
directly threaten our war of resistance and
indirectly give the Japanese assistance. Not
only am I dissatisfied with them, but the entire nation dislikes them. . . . They arouse
the progressive elements to disobedience to
the Central Government." On about January
18, General Sheng Shih-tsai, Governor of
Sinkiang Province, sent a telegram to Chungking in which he stated that after the military record of the Eighth Route and New
Fourth armies against Japan, there is no
ground or excuse for any "punitive campaign" against these armies. He declared
that if civil war develops in China now, this
can Ol}ly help the Japanese invaders in their
plan of conquering China; and that the
people and armies of Sinkiang stand solidly
behind a policy of unity, resistance, and
struggle against all those preparing to sell

CHINA

out to Japan under the cover of a so-called
"punitive campaign."
These significant and powerful political
figures have been ruthlessly side-tracked by
Chungking reactionaries throughout this present war. Their appeal-and also the appeal
from many other sections of China-indicates the widespread ferment going on in
all provinces of China behind the censorship veil. Armed clashes, reported but as yet
unverified, in four northern provinces, indicate that the military suppressions predicted by the Communists' Military Committee are still going on. In reading news one
should look for indications whether the Communist forces seem to be withdrawing to
form a new northern area, or whether the
agitation still goes on across all of China,
looking towards a new and more democratic
central government. If large scale civil war
is launched against Yenan, we may look to
see Communist forces break through the cordon of government troops which have continually blockaded them from any contact
with the U.S.S.R., and which-barring the
excuse of civil war-they would not dare
try to force. Then they might really secure
the arms which, during the whole war thus
far, they have been denied.
It will never be too late to save China.
She will survive. Her people will organize
under some banner to cast forth Japan, even
though it may not be under Chungking. But
it may soon be too late to prevent a powerful
Japanese attack on the Southeast Asian
front, which would inevitably involve yet another area in the Second World War. Only
swift action to preserve Chungking as the
center of Chinese unity can do that. The
quickest way to cut the Gordian knot might
be an immediate conference among the
American, British and Soviet Embassies in
Chungking, a pooling of information and
charges from both sides of the strife, and
joint pressure to stop a Chinese civil war.
Acting together, these three countries might
prevent a temporary crisis from becoming a
national and international disaster.
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